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A MODEL OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE
RATE ~DETERMINATION
ABSTRACT
Economic agents undertake actions to protect themselves from the short-run impact of
foreign exchange rate fluctuations: Nominal goods prices are set in consumers’ currencies, and firms
hedge foreign exchange risk. A model is presented here which shows that these features of the
economy can lead to indeterminacy in the nominal exchange rate in the short run. There can be
noise in the exchange rate, unrelated to any fundamentals, essentially because the short-run







CMENGEL@U.WASH~ GTON.EDUSince the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, nominal exchange
rates among industrialized countries have been extremely volatile. The short-run
movements in exchange rates have b=n much more extreme than early proponents of floating
rams (such as Friedman (1953) and Johnson (1972)) envisaged.
Two notable puzzles that arise in relation to this volatility are:
(1) What accounts for the volatility? Some of the tharetical models of the 1970s were
specifically designed to explain how the nominal exchange rate could be much more
volatile than the underlying economic fundamentals (notably Dombusch (1976)). But these
models have fared very badly empirically. Meese and Rogoff (1983a, 1983b), and
subsequently many others, have documented the failure of these models in explaining
short-run movements of exchange rates. While the models are more successful at longer
horizons (Mark (1995), Chinn and Meese (1995)), the movement of exchange rates at short
horizons seems independent of the movement in what are hypothesized to be the underlying
economic fundamentals (Flood and Rose (1995)).
(2) Despite the huge variability in nominal exchange rates, international trade does not
appear to have b=n greatly adversely affwted (see, for example, Kroner and Lastrapes
(1993)), On the contrary, there has been a steady opening of markets and expansion in
the volume of trade.
The story of this paper is simple: In the short run, nominal exchange rate changes
have essentially no rd effwts. But, since a change in the exchange rate does not
affect any agent’s behavior, the level of the exchange rate is indeterminate. Purely
extrinsic noise causes the exchange rate to fluctuate around the equilibrium value
determined by the fundamentals.
There are two essential elements to the model presented here. First, recent work
has noted that nominal exchange rate fluctuations have little effect on the prices
1consumers pay (Knetter (1989, 1993), Engel (1993), Engel and Rogers (1996)). There
appears to be forces of both pricing to market and nominal price stickiness at work in
international markets. Producers charge different prices for similar goods in different
markets. A German producer might charge one price for its product at home, and another
prim for sale in the U.S. The reasons for this type of price discrimination have b~n
explored extensively in r=nt literature (see, for example, Krugman (1987), Dombusch
(1987), Marston (1990)). Prices may not respond to exchange rate changes either for
reasons explored in the “pass-through” literature, or because there are menu-costs to
changing prices (such as in Mankiw (1985)).
While nominal price stickiness has bwn a feature of a long line of models of
exchange rates, generally the price stickiness in these models is of a different sort
than has ban observed in the data. Dombusch (1976), for example, assumes that
exporters set prices in their own currencies. If the dollar depreciates relative to the
mark, imports from Germany become more expensive for Americans in the Dombusch
formulation. But, the evidence suggests that, because firms price to market, they set
the price in the currency of the country that buys the good. German firms set the price
of their exports to the U.S. in dollar terms. A change in the exchange rate has no
effect on that price in the short run. 1
There is an effmt on the profits of a German firm, however, if the dollar
deprmiates and the German firm’s export price is fixed in dollars. The revenue per item
sold will decline in mark terms. The German firm’s profits are adversely tifected. But,
that leads to the second essential element of the model in this paper. Firms can hedge
against exchange rate fluctuations. A sufficiently insured firm can fully hedge against
losses from exchange rate fluctuations that are purely noise.
1 Some of the evidence in the pricing-to-market literature suggests that U.S firms
are different than other firms in their pricing behavior. But, Rangan and Lawrence
(1993) argue that this is an incorrect inference based on faulty data.
2Ind4, in the simple model presented here, all fluctuations in the exchange rate
are extrinsic. The exchange rate moves at the whim of foreign exchange traders. But
that noise affects nobody. Consumers are unaffectd because the prices they face are
fixed and unresponsive to exchange rate changes. The exchange rate risk that firms face
is fully diversifiable. The firms simply make contracts that s~ify that the winners
from exchange rate changes pay off the losers. Since the exchange rate fluctuations have
no other real effects, the firms desire these contracts -- their expected return is
unchanged by the contracts, but the risk from exchange rate fluctuations is eliminated.
The model in this paper is different than other raent models of exchange rate
indeterminacy (e.g., King, Wallace and Webcr (1992), Manuelli and P-k (1990)). Here,
the indeterminacy arises from two specific observable features of the international
economy -- pricing-to-market and hedging of exchange rate risk. The idea of this paper
does build naturally on the notion that pricing to market increases exchange rate
volatility in equilibrium (Krugman (1989), Betts and Devereux (1996)). In the model of
this paper, there is “excess” volatility, in the sense that purely extrinsic noise
affects the exchange rate.
Section 1 presents a simple static general equilibrium model of two countries with
a large number of firms selling products at home and abroad. The model is one with
flexible prices and a determinate exchange rate. Its purpose is to determine the
expected prices and exchange rates that firms and consumers face. In section 2, we
rquire that prices be set in advance of the determination of the exchange rate. Prices
will be set at the quilibrium level from section 1. Firms will also make contracts to
hedge the risk of the exchange rate ending up at some level other than the expected rate
from the model of section 1. The exchange rate will be seen to be indeterminate.
Section 3 discusses some of the empirical implications of this model. One is that
there will be little relation betwmn exchange rates and fundamentals in the short run,
3but that they will be closely related in the long run, Other possible avenues for
empirical work for future versions of this paper are discussed. The section also
mnsiders implications of this model for other issues, such as the responsiveness of
trade to exchange rate changes, and the choice of nominal exchange rate regime.
There is one major determinant of exchange rates that the model ignores -- the role
of speculation in stabilizing the exchange rate. In the model, the exchange rate is
influenced by extrinsic noise in the short-run, which implies that there is an expected
profit opportunity for speculators who bet that the exchange rate will return to its
fundamental value. This speculation ought to help nail down the exchange rate. On the
other hand, hundreds of studies of forward foreign exchange rate market efficiency have
documented the empirical regularity that the forward rate is a biased predictor of future
spot rates, and have made essentially no progress in explaining this bias with models of
rational risk-averse economic agents (SW Hodrick (1987) and Engel (1996) for
comprehensive surveys. ) It is difficult to reject the conclusion that foreign exchange
market s~ulators do allow expected profit opportunities to go unexploited. But, this
paper does not attempt to tackle that difficult subjwt: it sidesteps it completely. It
s=ms likely, however, that the issues raised here concerning how economic agents protmt
themselves from the effats of foreign exchange rate fluctuations could play a role in
future research into understanding the efficiency or inefficiency of international
capiti markets.
1. The Equilibrium Model
The model is of two countries, call them the U.S. and Germany, that are identicd
in the sense that consumers have the same utility functions, producers have the same
4production functions, and the economies are of the same size. This is a model with no
uncertainty.
Consumer$
Consumers in the U.S. maximize
1 l-R + &.(M’d/p)l-R U=nQ + &(l-L)l-R. o< @<l
where
In this function, ~ is consumption of good i. The range from O to 1/2 are
produced irl the U.S., and the goods indexed from 1/2 to 1 are produced in Germany. Md is
the nominal quantity of money demanded by Americans. L is supply of labor.
P is defined by
Some points about the utility function can be briefly noted. All goods enter
utility symmetrically. The restriction that #1lie between zero and unity is nmessary
for an equilibrium with monopolistic producers of each good. Rd balances appear in the
utility function as a simple way of capturing the transactions
R can be interpreted as the measure of relative risk aversion
The budget constraint faced by an American
f}i~di + Md =wL+M+ IT,
The price of good i is pi. All of these prices are
wage rate paid in competitive labor markets is w.
is
expressed
motive for holding money.
for consumers.2
in terms of dollars. The
All individuals receive a transfer of
money, M. Finally, all individuals are endowed with equal ownership in each of the
American firms. II is the amount of profits paid to the representative American.
2 See the discussion on risk aversion and risk neutrality with multiple goods in
Engel (1992).
5The first-order conditions for goods, money and labor demands imply:
qi = @i/P)-l’@Q,
Md = PQelm,
L = 1 - Q(P/w)lm.
Symmetridy, the optimization problem faced by Germans is to maximin
u“ = &Q
ll-R + &.(M*d/p”)l-R + &(l-L*)l-R. 0<0<1
subject to
~~~q~di + M“d = w*L* + M* + IT”.
Two things to note: Germans hold marks. There is no currency substitution. Also, the
budget constraint is expressed in terms of marks.
Goods, money and labor demands for Germans are
q; = (p~/P”)-l’@Q*,
M“d = P*Q*elm,
L* = 1 - Q“(P”/w*)lm.
Firms
For i < 1/2, goods are produced in the U.S.; and
German firms. Each good is producd by a monopolist.
Yi = ;L,.
Firms set prices for Americans in dollar
this s~tion, this has no particular importance,
terms and
but it will
section in which we assume nominal price stickiness.
We assume the population in each country is unity,
given by:
for i > 1/2, goods are produced by
The production function is simply:
for Germans in mark terms. In
come into play in the next
so that demand for firm i‘s
product from Americans is ~ md from Germans is q:. So,
~=q+ q;.
The Americm firms maximize
‘i = pi~, + ‘PTql - Wa(qi+q;)
6Here, s is the dollar price of marks. We have expressed the firm’s objective in nominal
terms, but as there is no uncertainty in this model, this makes no difference.
The firm can charge different prices to the two markets. There is no possibility
for arbitrage by consumers, The optimal prices for the firm are:
Pi= E’
p; = ~.
These are the standard mark-up pricing rule for a monopolist facing demand curves with
constant elasticities.
For i > 1/2,
market. Its pricing
the German firm sets prices for its own market and for the American
rule is:




consumer-owners of the firms:
Equilibrium requires in each country that money
demand equal labor supply. Each firm operates along
demand equaI money supply and labor
the demand curve that it faces, so
each goods market will be in equilibrium for optimizing firms. The aggregate budget
constraint in each country must also be satisfied.









From the definition of profits
~ = ~~nidi = J~@iqi+sptqt)dl - wL.
So, the budget wnstraint can be rewritten as
f~,2pi~di = ~~sp~q~di.
this way, the budget constraint in the U.S. is the constraint that the value of the
its imports, f~,zpl~di, equals the value of its exports, f~sp~q~di.











Me-]m(a+(a/(l-@)) lm); p; = M*e-lm(a+(a/(l-@)) lm);
l-@M*e-lm(~ + (a/(l-@))lm); l-@M~-lm(a+(~/( l.@))lm); w“ = ~
a
M-
2. Price stickiness and exchange rate indeterminacy
Now we will consider an alternative view of markets, in which firms must set
nominal prices first, and then financial markets determine the exchange rate.
Recent empirical work suggests that prices are sticky in terms of the consumer’s
currency. We will assume stickiness of this sort. Implicitly, we assume that there are
some menu costs to changing prices, although the menu costs are not modeled explicitly.
In the model of this
exchange rate are rdized.
section, firms must choose prices
There is no intrinsic uncertainty
before the wage rate and the
in the model, The
8exogenous variables (such as the money supplies) are not subject to random shocks. But
there can be extrinsic uncertainty. The exchange rate’s value is a random variable that
does not depend on the exogenous fundamentals. We will derive the properties of the
distribution of that random variable.
Consumers make their choices with full certainty about the wonomic environment.
They know all goods prices, the wage rate, the exchange rate, firms’ profits, etc. So,
their optimization problem is exactly the same as the one described in section 1. Their
demand curves are the same as in that section.
For the firms, we assume that each American firm can buy units of a contract of the
following {orm: if the actual exchange rate, s’, is greater than T, the equilibrium
exchange rate from section 1, the firm gives (~ - 1) to the insurer for each dollar of
insurance the firm has purchased. Likewise, if s’ is less than T, the firm receives -($
- 1) from the insurer for each dollar of insurance.
We will also assume that if s’ is greater than T, that each foreign firm receives
(1 - ~) from the insurer for each mark of insurance they buy, and they pay -(1 - $)
when s’ is less than T.
We note that the profits of the domestic firm are given by:
~i = pi% + S’ p~qf - WU(~+Cl~) - (~ - l)xi - coher-
e xi is dollars of insurance that the firm purchases and C is the cost of the




+ pfqf - w“a(~+q~) + (1 - ~)x~ - C*(x~).
We now claim an ~uilibnum is given by:
% = ~i~ q; = ~;;
9[1
C(p:q;) = o, C*Y = o;
and s’ is a random draw from a distribution in which E(ln(s’ )) = In(s).
In the notation above, a “-” refers to the equilibrium value of the variable from Section
1.
To show this is an equilibrium, we will see that at these values consumers
(domestic and foreign) and firms (domestic and foreign) have no incentive to change their
behavior.
First note that in this quilibrium
‘i = Piqi + ‘PIqT -
Profits for the domestic firm are




I — + P~~T - ‘“a(~i+qf), x
which is exactly the same level of profits the firm
as in section 1, Likewise, for the
received in section 1 in equilibrium.
So, consider the problem facing a domestic consumer. The profits it receives, ~,
are the same as in wtion 1; it receives the same money transfer, M, from the
government; and, the wages and prices it faces are the same as in swtion 1. Hence, it
will choose the same quantities of each good, and the same quantity of money; and, it
will supply the same quantity of labor. A similar argument holds for foreign consumers.
Turning to the firms, first consider the US. firm, which must chwse prices and xi
10before the exchange rate is known, We assume that the managers of the firm are concerned
not only with the expectd profits, but also are concerned with the uncertainty about
profits. Americans cannot buy shares in German firms, and vice-versa. So, Americans
cannot diversify exchange risk through their portfolio holdings. Hence, the owners
the firms dirwt the managers to diversify the risk so as to maximize the owners’
expected utility.
of
Assume for the moment that s’ is distributed such that E(s’ ) = T. Then, the
ex~ted profits for the U.S. firm in the proposed equilibrium are
E(mi) = Piqi + T P;q; - w a(qi ‘q;).
Note that the expected profits are not a functio[l of the amount of insurance purchased.
The firm can eliminate all risk and not affect its expected profits if it purchases xi =
T p~q~. In this case, the firm’s profits are independent of the actual exchange rate, s’.
The firm’s profits will be known with cefinty, so the firm chooses its price to
maximize its profits, given by:
Since this is exactly the problem the firm faces in section 1, it chooses ~ = ~ i; q: =
A similar argument would apply to the German firm.
Since consumers’ choices are the same as in
the same,
We
clearly the same values of ~, q;, pi, p;,
still n~ to show that C( T P ~~ ~) = O
the total payout by American firms is
f~(s’-~)~~~~di.
section 1, and producers choices are
w and w“ will be ~uilibrium values.
[1
and, C“ ~ = O. To see this, note that
Y
The total receipts by German firms, expressed in dollar terms are
11f’ (~’-~)riqidi
112 Y“
The total payout by American firms equals the total rweipts by German firms, since
‘~~~;~~di = ‘~,~Pi~idi~
by the equilibrium wndition from wtion 1.
The net payout is zero, irrespective of the rdization of the exchange rate, s’.
If the administrative costs of providing insurance are zero, and the insurance market is
competitive, the price of the insurance will qual its cost -- zero -- in equilibrium,
This demonstrates that an equilibrium exists in which consumers’ purchases are the
same as the equilibrium quantities in section 1, prices and wages are the same as in
swtion 1, profits for all firms are the same as in section 1, and employment is the same
as in section 1. All of this is independent of the actual level of the exchange rate,
s’ . So, there is nothing that ties down the exchange rate -- it is indeterminate.
Something has been swept under the rug in the derivation of the equilibrium
but now it must be brought out into the open.
above,
Suppose E(s’ ) = x, as we postulated when solving the U.S. firm’s problem. Then,
clearly, the American firm’s expected profits under un~rta.inty with no insurance
contract are the same as their actual profits in section 1. This firm would fully insure
against exchange rate fluctuations if the insurance were frm.
But, the foreign firm’s ex~ted profits in this case are higher than its certain
profits when the exchange rate equals x. To sw





this, note that when the exchange rate
country, expressed in foreign currency
[1
F, ~i,~i > Piqi if E(s’) = T,
s T’
12bwause E(l/s’ ) > l/E(s’ ) by Jensen’s inequality.
Why might the firms diversify all of their exchange rate risk, as postulated in the
equilibrium? First, note that the firms would want to diversify a pretty large fraction
of this risk even though the expected return from the risky situation is greater than in
the nskless situation.
Suppose, for example that s’ were distributed such that E(ln(s’ )) = ln( T ) -- which
is how the equilibrium is described above. (If the equilibrium distribution of exchange
rates has this property, the hedging problem faced by American and German firms is
symmetric. ) Then the Appendix shows that assuming ln(s’ ) is normally distributed, a risk
2R-(1/~) f the profits, where R is the averse firlll would want to insure a fraction ~o
coefficient of relative risk aversion and ~ is the fraction of expected revenues derived
from foreign sales.
Reeent empirical studies of foreign exchange markets suggest that models using
ex~ted utility analysis have a hard time explaining the size of the foreign exchange
risk premium unless consumers are assumed to be very risk averse (see Engel (1996)). So,
to calibrate the share of profits that are hedged in the ex~ted utility framework, we
should choose a large value of R. For example, Mark (1985) estimates a value greater
than 50. If 7 = 1/2, then the firms would hedge 98 per cent of the risk. If R equals
ten, 90 per cent of the risk is hedged.
If there is a small cost for consumer-owners to monitor the exchange rate, the
owners will instruct firm managers to hedge 100 per cent of the exchange rate risk.
If it were not for the effat of exchange rates on their firms’ profits, consumers
would have no reason to know the exchange rate. They face prices and wages denominated
in their own currency. If the firm did not hedge all of the exchange rate risk, the
consumers would have to monitor exchange rates in order to know what dividends they are
supposed to receive from the firm. If they did not know the exchange rate, the managers
13might lie to the owners about the effwt of the exchange rate on the profits -- for
instance, claiming a loss from exchange rate fluctuations when in fact there was a gain
(so the managers could pocket the difference.)
If the managers were instructed to hedge all exchange rate risk, the profits of the
firm would be independent of the exchange rate. Even though 100% hedging is not optimal
if monitoring costs are zero, we have shown that it is nearly so. When there are some
small monitoring costs, it will be optimal for the owners to instruct the firm managers
to hdge all exchange rate risk.
Note that it is important that the exchange rate is centered on the quilibrium
exchange rate. That is, E(ln(s’ )) = ln( T ). If the mean of the exchange rate were much
different than its fundamental value from section 1, then either the American firms or
the German firms would find they would want to hedge far less than 100 per cent of the
exchange rate risk, bmause there would be a trade-off between risk and return. For
example, if E(ln(s’ )) was much greater than ln( g ), domestic firms’ expected profits would
increase significantly as the fraction of profits hedged was smaller. The implication
here is that even though the exchange rate is indeterminate in the model, the
indeterminacy is of a particular form. The noise in the exchange rate is not systematic,
so that E(ln(s’ )) = in(T).
The argument for indeterminacy rests on firms hedging 100 per cent of the risk. If
they did not, then s’ affects firms’ profits. This would in turn have an income effect
for consumers which would affect their demands. But, then the equilibrium would depend
on s’. But, if owners want to avoid the cost of monitoring the exchange rate, so they
have the managers hedge 100 per cent of the exchange rate risk, the exchange rate will be
indeterminate.
143. Empirical Implications and Directions for Future Research
The model here is static. As was noted in the introduction, a fully dynamic model
would n~ to capture the behavior of foreign exchange spulators.
that here. If we abstract from international capital markets, allowing
lending,3 then the dynamic model would be the static model repeated
We do not attempt
no borrowing or
period by period.
The model does have a useful and interesting empirical implication. The basic
result here is that in any period, the log of the exchange rate is equal to its
fundamental value plus a mean-zero extrinsic error term:
ln(~ = f, + ct.
Now, suppose that the fundamentals have a unit root. The previous equation implies







the short run correlation in their changes could be quite low. Note
= ,+I-f, + c,+~ - ct. f
follows a random walk,
f1+1 = ft + q+,,
the correlation between ln(~+ ,)-in(s) and ft+~-f[is equal to
where m: is the variance of ~ and a; is the variance of CL. This correlation could be
fairly small if the variance of the extrinsic noise, r:, were large.
This observation is consistent with the recent literature on empirical exchange
3 And, if cash balances are taxed away at the end of the period, as in Grilli and
Roubini (1992).
15iate models. While it has ben shown that in the short run the relation betw=n the
exchange rate and the fundamentals is tenuous (Meese and Rogoff (1983a, 1983b) and
Frankel and Meese (1987)), recent work shows tnat in the long run exchange rates and
fundamentals are related (Chinn and Meese (1995), Mark (1995), and NlacDonald and Taylor
(1994)). This model also implies that there is excess volatility of the exchange rate,
in the sense of Huang (1981), or bubbles as defined by Mwse (1986).
Another implication of the model is that the volume of trade does not change much
in response to changes in the exchange rate. Of course, this is exactly the empirical
observation that motivated the entire literature on exchange-rate pass-through.
Flood and Rose (1995) have noted that the volatility of the exchange rate is
unrelated to the volatility of fundamentals. Specifically, when nominal exchange rates
are fixed or targeted within narrow bands, the fundamentals are no less variable than
when exchange rates are floating. That finding is exactly consistent with the model
presented here. A further implication of the model in this paper is that the choice of
nominal exchange rate regime does not much matter for short-run considerations. Exchange
rate volatility does not concern any agents because it does not affect consumers’ prices,
and firms hedge away the exchange rate risk.
The model presented in this paper raises several interesting issues for further
research:
We take the menu-cost pricing as exogenously given. However, it seems plausible
that nominal prices of imported goods would respond less to nominal exchange rate changes
if the exchange rate changes were not based on changes in fundamentals. As we have
noted, these exchange rate fluctuations tend to be transitory. In dynamic models of
menu-cost pricing, firms tend are less likely to change prices in response to transitory
shocks. This presents the possibility y of an interesting source of feedback betw~n menu-
cost pricing and exchange-rate instability. On the one hand, a principle source of the
16short-run indeterminacy of the exchange rate in our model is
firms may be more likely to choose menu-cost pricing in the
nonfundamental fluctuations in exchange rates.
the menu-cost pricing. But,
face of short-run
We have ignored the effects of exchange rate fluctuations on the values of foreign-
held assets in our model. This may not be a bad approximation, given the extreme home-
bias in asset holdings that has been noted. Perhaps the model presented here could even
help explain that home bias. Empirical models have indicated that the variance of
investors’ portfolios could be substantially reduced with more international
diversification.4 But, those estimates may overstate the gains from diversification. It
is likely that the econometrician overstates the conditional variance of returns from
domestic assets, because the ~onometrician does not use all the information that
investors use to calculate expected returns. On the other hand, if a great dd of the
short-run uncertainty in exchange rates is pure noise, then the econometrician probably
does not much overstate the variance of returns on foreign assets. The net effect of
this is that the ~onometrician probably overstates the variance of portfolios that are
biased toward home assets relative to internationally diversified portfolios.
Finally, the model does not address how the exchange rate is determined and who
determines it. The exchange rate is pure noise, unrelated to fundamentals. But, a more
complete story might include the behavior of the “chartists” of Frankel and Froot (1990).
Their chartists are speculators whose expectations are not rational, but are determined
by “charts” of past behavior of the nominal exchange rate. Since the actual level of the
exchange rate is not important to the “fundamentalists” in our model, who have protectd
themselves from exchange rate noise by setting nominal prices ahead of time and hedging
the effeets of foreign exchange fluctuations on profits, a complete dynamic model might
have a role for the chartists.
4 For example, see Tesar and Werner (1994)
17Appendix
Derivation of Share of Profits Hedged
Take the representative’s indirect utility function to be a function of firms’
total revenue, since ultimately the firm owner r=ives all of the revenue either as
profit or wages. Let TR denote total revenue, so:
TR = Z + S’Z* - (S’- T)AZ*,
where z q pq, z* = p“q”, and A is the share of foreign revenues hedged.
First, note
U(TR) s U(E(TR)) + U’ (E(TR))(TR-E(TR)) + jU’’(E(TR))(TR-E(TR))2.
Then,
E(U(TR)) ~ U(E(TR)) + ;U’’(E(TR))va-rWR)
= U(Z + T Z*A + (1-A) z*E(s’ )) + ~U’’(E(TR))((l-A)Z*) 2Var(S’ ).
If s’ is normally distributed, we have:
E(s’ ) = E(el”(s’’) = eE(ln(s”) + ‘1’2)vU(1n(s’ ‘).
With E(ln(s’ )) = ln( T ), we have
E(sJ ) = ~ e(ljz)v~(ln(s’ )) ~ T (1+~Var(ln(s’ )).
Also, Var(s’ ) + T 2Var(ln(s’ )).
The first-order condition, then, is
dE(U(m)) ~=
U’ (E(TR))[~T z“Var(ln(s’ ))] - U“(E(TR))Z“2T 2Var(ln(s’ ))(l-h) = O,
where we have assumed U“’ (E(TR))Var(TR) s O.
From the first-order condition, we have
-j + yR(l-a) = O,
&
-E(TR)U’’(E(TR)) ~d ~ ~ T l “. where R s
182R-(1/v) This implies h = ~.
Since exchange rates are log-normally distributed, and E(ln(s’ )) = ln( x ), the
hedging problem of the foreign firms is symmetric. In our model 7 is approximately equal
to 1/2.
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